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NAVAL OFFICERS' WORLD AFFAIRS SEMINAR

"Power Politics in the Far East"

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Ladies and Gentlemen:

It is a very, very, great pleasure to be with you today. The subject that you have asked me to talk about this afternoon is the situation in the Far East as it relates to Geopolitics. I do not know what Geopolitics are. I have a vague impression that if you get a bottle of whiskey and a globe and study both a long time, that you will come out with heart lands here and heart lands there and you will see the relationship of things to each other much more clearly. In my own simple-minded manner I like to look at a situation in as complicated a way as I can from the political, economic, and military, angle. I was not aware of the importance of military factors as much as I should have been perhaps, until I was on the faculty of the Naval War College under Admiral Hill as commandant in 1948. Living with people no less in rank than Navy Captains and Army Colonels, I came to respect not only rank but also the importance of military factors in world affairs. It is a matter I am very serious about, it is something that is very sadly lacking in our general approach to political science. I think if you could put all the political scientists in this country through the National War College it would do them no harm whatsoever. It wouldn't do any harm either to the National War College, because I found the gentlemen to be of such tough fibre that nothing could disturb them.

The major thing that has happened in the Far East, of course, as it effects the security of the United States in the last five years, has been the Communist conquest of China. This has changed the whole balance of power in the Far East and I assure you that if there is one thing that has been of concern to the United States ever since we have come into contact with the Far East, it has been the balance of power. The major effort that the United States has made in this part of the world has been to prevent the one thing that has now happened and that is an alliance between any of the three big powers, the Soviet Union, Japan, or China. It has been our general idea to keep them apart and the pivot of our policy has always been Manchuria. In fact at one time Secretary Knox actually suggested that we neutralize Manchuria. We have backed up the Japanese when the Russians were getting too tough and we have actually backed up the Russians when the Japanese were getting too tough. We have always tried to keep China in an independant position. Now this is one of those beautiful examples where principle and interest were combined. It is very high principle to maintain the independance of a state. It is also a matter of our national interest that we did so.

Just for a moment I think you might reflect upon the way in which a good many American policies have developed, especially in the nineteenth century, under the threat of British power. It was the general idea of American policy

makers in the early days of the republic, that the less important the British were that the safer would be the United States. This would apply particularly to the Far East. We saw the British coming in in 1842 in China where they signed the treaty of Nanking. The American treaty was signed in 1844, two years later. We followed them in every step that they made, and of course you remember the famous occasion in 1859, when Admiral Hope, standing off Taku Bar when the British Marines, in one of the earliest amphibious operations in history, got stuck in the mud on their way ashore, gave some assistance using the famous phrase, "blood is thicker than water". This was one of the very few occasions upon which there was the slightest cooperation between the two powers in the nineteenth century. But out of this ambition to see that the British Empire was limited as much as possible, the United States developed this policy of maintaining wherever possible the independence of self-governing oriental states. The movement into Japan in 1853 was very much dictated by the desire to anticipate the British and the Russians. Russian fleets were sailing around the bottom end of Japan and it was feared that if the United States did not move in very rapidly either the British or the Russians would have it and it would be assumed, of course, that the British would take China if they possibly could. So in order to limit the extent of the British Empire there developed a theory of supporting an independent China, a principle with which we have been connected for many many years.

A balance of power has been maintained with a certain amount of success over a very long period. It was no accident that an earlier President Roosevelt was the arbiter at the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, and that was Portsmouth, New Hampshire not anywhere else. As the arbiter of that treaty between Japan and Russia we threw our weight into the scales to try to see that the Japanese should not take everything that they wanted, which was, of course, most of Manchuria. We kept the Japanese limited to Korea and parts of Korea, which they finally took over completely in 1910 and we saw that the Russians, having been defeated, should not lose everything in the Eastern part of Asia. Many times after that and particularly in 1931 when the Japanese moved into Manchuria we made it clear that we didn't like it a bit and the famous non-recognition doctrine of Colonel Stimson was designed to reserve Manchuria for future treatment in the hope that someday, sometime, someplace, the Japanese could be forced out of Manchuria as they had been forced out of the province of Shantung in 1922 after the Washington Treaty. The balance of power is the basic American policy in the Far East.

Christianity and commerce have been extremely important factors, but as most of you have read your way through all the records of the United States Navy Department in the nineteenth century, you will recall that if they had had their way we would have been in Hawaii in 1850 and by the end of the century we would have been on every piece of real estate that we have had to fight for during the late unpleasantness. The real estate that Commodore Perry actually purchased on Okinawa might have been quite a profitable investment, if the Navy Department had had its way. In the textbooks on the subject you will find very little reference to the security angle in United States policy in the Pacific. All the references are to Christianity and to commerce, but I think it was the security angle which was the real matrix of most of our policies.

Today the awful thing has happened. Two of these three powers have now tied together in a very firm alliance and that is the Moscow-Peiping entente. That alliance is based upon very real power factors in the Far East, factors which we have long anticipated and long dreaded. The basis of this alliance is very simple to detect. It is made easier by the fact that the Chinese and the Russian leaders both speak the same language, both have the same ideology, both have the same approach towards life, both believe essentially the same basic things. This makes it easier, but it would have been quite possible without that. In fact, there is very good reason to believe that Chiang Kai-shek was offered exactly the same alliance several times. I was recently on Formosa talking this over with Hank Leiberhan of the New York Times, an old friend of mine, and a few weeks later he told me that he had seen Chiang Kai-shek and he said, "you know I put that question to him, after I had amused him with a few dirty stories." I said, "why didn't you take the offer from the Russians?" and he said, "I didn't trust them." Which is perfectly sound reasoning. But he didn't deny that he could have had it.

The basis of the alliance is very simple. The Chinese expect to get the military weapons, the technical assistance, the diplomatic support, and all the backing that is necessary to recover the military and political prestige and leadership of China in Asia. They enjoyed this for a very long time. They are a proud and military people. The myth that China is a peaceful country and a peaceful people is indeed a myth, because of the propaganda of the civilian ruling class of China. They have a long and distinguished military history. Only twice in two thousand years have they been conquered. Once by the Mongols and once by the Manchus. They have been half conquered several times but only twice have they been fully conquered and in both cases they have eventually gotten rid of the conqueror. They have not absorbed their conquerors as the other general fallacy goes. They have only absorbed them when they have thrown them out and let them live as servants. They have produced some of the greatest military writers in history and this ambition to recover their military and political prestige and weight in Asia is something that appeals to a very deep instinct in the Chinese people.

From the treaty the Russians get something else, they get an ally willing and able, they hope, to stir up enough trouble in Asia, to take over enough territory to deny us, the Western Powers, access to that part of Asia. They fit into the general strategic plan that they have for the conquest of Japan because one of the immediate objectives of this alliance is, of course, Japan. Japan is the chief prize as far as the Communists are concerned in the Pacific and they are moving on to Japan in the same way, on the same general, strategic, concept, that they are moving into Europe. Just as the best way for them to upset the balance of power in Europe, is to cut through the Far East and to disturb the whole economic, political, foundations of the European Powers and of ourselves in the Far East, so they are moving on to Japan, first by moving into Southeast Asia. Because by denying to Japan the access to Southeast Asia, the rice bowl, the market for Japanese goods, by denying Japan access to that part of the world, they put upon us and the Japanese together the terrible problem of providing for the self-sufficiency of that country. A terrible problem, indeed, because most of Japan's industry was geared to the control of

Manchuria and to the China market. It was geared to Chinese coking coal, not to ours which is transported from our ports on the West Coast here at twenty dollars a ton with ten dollars for freight. This is too high a price for a permanent basis with the Japanese economy. By moving into southeast Asia then, they can put Japan into a position where she is even more dependent upon us, or she has to do the other thing, move into the arms of the Communists at a very considerable price. The psychological time bomb that the Communists have prepared in this case, is, of course, of a well known variety. They have started already, they started a long time ago, on the line that the Japanese must not be subservient to the United States and must not serve the end to American imperialism and help its economic aggression. This time bomb they expect will explode with a considerable amount of force at such time as they can put the economic and military squeeze on Japan to such an extent that there is dissatisfaction both in this country and in Japan. Dissatisfaction in this country in never being able to get Japan off our backs, and dissatisfaction in Japan on the basis of pride and nationalism at being always in the economic pockets of the United States.

This balance of power has changed to such an extent that we have done several things about it. By taking a quick look at the map you can see the military line that we have drawn. This is the famous military line that played quite a role in the late Senate discussions. The line runs through Japan, the Philippines, and now I assume Formosa, although it has never been formally stated so, and the inner lines through the islands that we fought over during the war. In other words we have extended our military commitment to the furthest reaches of the Western Pacific. We have a military alliance with Japan, with the Philippine Islands, with Australia and New Zealand. If any of these countries are at war we are at war too. This extension of our military commitments is very serious, very new and it is very solid. There goes together with that a political decision which does not always overlap too well with the military decision.

The political decision is that there shall not be, if we can prevent it, any further expansion of Communist power in Asia. This decision was born, actually, at the time of the Korean conflict and has hardened more and more ever since. We have not, and I happen to think, fortunately, committed ourselves to any further exact lines and points as to where we would fight if we were challenged. I say fortunately, because I believe that if we did so it would extend much too far the area in which a possible enemy could pick a struggle if he so wished. It is not to our advantage to be pinned down all over the place and leave to the enemy the initiative in walking over a line here or a line there and forcing us to decide whether or not we are going to fight.

The balance of power has brought about then, this big military decision, and it has, of course, put us into the business of trying to bring together several nations in Asia into some form of political alliance or economic agreement that will ultimately lead up, we hope, to the framing of much more solid mutual assistance pacts in many more territories when the conditions are right. We are compelled to do this with all the many disadvantages. It had been hoped that at the end of the war we would look forward to making China the pivot of our policy. We had hoped that China would be a free, democratic, united, and strong country, and that China with a weaker Japan would be the basis of our policy. This of course, has not been so.

In 1949 we had to switch rapidly from China to Japan, a fact which has embarrassed our policy in Japan to some extent. We have demanded rearmament in Japan, which indeed we have to, whether we like it or not, and we have had to do this at a time when Japanese opinion was not really ready for it. We have to sell an ex-enemy to many people who have not yet forgotten the war. When I was lecturing at the University of Manila not many months ago, I got through my talk and the very first question came from a Filipino student. He said to me, "Can you explain to me how your country can possibly come to terms with Japan. How can you possibly make a peace treaty with that country?" They had not forgotten the Japanese occupation and when you walk around Manila, as many of you probably have recently, and you compare it with Tokyo, you will observe that the rebuilding of Tokyo has gone ahead much faster than that of Manila. The Australians, of course, are neurotic on the subject of Japan and part of the price of our peace treaty with Japan was the military security pacts with Australia and New Zealand.

The disadvantages are considerable. They are not without advantages, but I want to stress that this change in the whole balance of power has been so sudden, and our adjustment to it so rapid, that you could hardly expect that we could have done it with grace, and (ourtesy and unfailing attention to the needs of others. On the contrary it had to be done quickly and we have had to move rapidly into a vacuum that was extremely dangerous from our point of view.

Now, looking at it from our side, what are some of the problems that we have in organizing the balance of power in our favor and in our direction? Let us not forget the strength of the Peiping-Moscow Alliance. Because this alliance is on very firm foundations, I do not think that there is any Titoism possible. I am not suggesting that the Chinese are going to turn always with a glow of genial good will towards Moscow and like everything that Moscow wants. They may possibly dislike Moscow intensely but I am suggesting that if any Chinese leader gets any Titoist idea in his head, he will hardly survive the thought. The Russians are far too powerful in Manchuria, in fact it is almost a separate country and there are over 80,000 Russian advisors in China itself. They have taken very good care of any possibility of Titoism again and let me also remind you that it was the Russians who threw Tito out, not Tito who threw out the Russians and for months after Tito was thrown out, was excommunicated, he was pathetically trying to justify himself in the eyes of the Russian party. Well, just to round up this particular point in order to clarify my position on this, I feel that this alliance is on a sound foundation, that the mutual interest of each party, that the Chinese Communist leaders and the Russian Communist leaders believe between them a set of these things which we are not likely to shake very easily. They believe that they belong to the progressive, the democratic, part of the world. They believe that they are riding the wave of the future, and that we are riding the wave down into destruction. They think that we shall "provoke" a world war. We shall "provoke" that world war because, having built up our productive forces to a very high degree, we shall have so much material on our hands that we shall have to sell it. We shall get into cycles of terrific unemployment and in order to avoid unemployment at home and the rivalries and difficulties between capitalist powers we shall plunge ourselves into a world conflict and somebody is going to win. They think they are going to win. Mao Tse-tung believes that he has chosen the winning side

and he has chosen it, never to turn back. He has stated so in public and he couldn't possibly get out of it.

We can expect, therefore, from them, the same kind of behavior that we had from Hitler. I think that they will negotiate just about as much as Hitler negotiated in the last days. In other words we will have to blast them out if they are to be removed. This applies to a not inconsiderable group of men, small compared to the population of China, but a very considerable group of men.

It is not generally realized that the Soviet Union plus the Chinese Communists in China, trained, indoctrinated and brought up, many more Chinese than we've ever influenced. We have had a lot of Chinese in the United States--thousands and thousands. They have been in the United Kingdom, they have been in Japan, but I think its a very fair estimate to say, that if you count the hundreds and hundreds who have been trained in the military and political schools of Moscow from 1919 onwards up to 1949, quite a long time, and if you count those who were trained and indoctrinated in the Soviet areas of China itself, they have influenced far more Chinese leaders than we have.

We are up against people who intend to do in the rest of Asia, exactly what they have done so successfully in China. It took them thirty years in China. I consider this the latest but not necessarily the last phase of the struggle that we embarked upon as early as 1922 in the case of China. These are the same men, who seized China, who are now moving into the rest of Asia. I say that I feel that Japan is the main objective but they have military operations on now in Indo-China, in Malaya, and with the Hukbolahap's in the Philippine Islands. It is not only their military operations that are important, they are engaged, (and the Chinese in Formosa watched this in fascinating horror), they are engaged in roughly the same sort of preparation on our level. In Japan, I have been in Tokyo Imperial University many times and watched the student demonstrations, the Communists getting hold of the students again as they did in China, ten or fifteen years ago, raising phony issues about academic freedom, getting the whole situation confused and all the values torn upside down. Out of this they get leadership, they find out the students who behave the best from their point of view. They get them for leaders and train them and get them into the fold. They use everything. They do not sell themselves as Communists. They identify themselves with movements that already exist. They are exploiting particularly the feeling of the Japanese against rearmament.

That feeling is not as unreasoning as you would suppose. When you look into it you will find that the Japanese welcomed our occupation. The Japanese who welcomed our occupation for the first three or four years, welcomed it because we came as people who liberated him from the old military clique that had ruled Japan and from the old feudal value system of Japan. This was an ancient system of values which to us seem strange and weird, that affected the relationships between the sexes, between master and servant in this very hierarchical society. They see in the return of rearmament, in the return of the military, the return of the old feudal value system. They see the return of the author-

itative family, the women going back into the position they were before. They see the clock being turned back rapidly on the social plane and they don't like it. You may say that their attitude is unreasonable, just as you may say that the attitude of India is unreasonable. They don't realize the danger that lies ahead of them but when people have just been liberated from something it is very difficult to persuade them not to go on fearing its return, and that is what is happening to them. In fact the Communists have been able to whip up more anti-imperialist enthusiasm from the countries that have been freed from the imperial powers than they could have possibly have done when the imperial powers were still there. This is just human nature. We assume that once a country is free like India or Burma that they would be delighted and happy and love us ever afterwards. The contrary is true. Once they are able to express their emotions they express them and cherish them.

The job that we have is a complicated one. The job of pulling together as much as we possibly can, these countries of Asia into some resemblance of a power structure that would under pin the efforts that we are able to put into that part of the world.

How about Japan? We seem to be in the position of men who are pushing a rice bowl into one hand and a gun into another. With our military programs we are pushing a gun into their hands and with our economic program, MSA, point four, ECA, etc., we seem to be pushing a rice bowl into the hand of the guy that wants to fight. Now the real thing that matters to us, of course, is what is in the mind of the fellow, rather than what is in his belly or in his hand. It is which way he will turn the gun, how he is going to feel about it? That is the question that is of real importance to us.

It is not an easy matter to try to get across in this area of the world, a system of alliances and the friendship, etc., which will be favorable to the United States. We have done pretty well in Japan and considering the potential difficulties in Japan, extraordinarily well. There is no question as to the anti-communist feeling of the Japanese ruling group. In fact they were horrified in 1945 when we let all the Communists out of the prisons in Japan, and rightly horrified. There is no question about that, but on the other hand they have to live, and the chief problem with Japan is not the question of military power and economic power, at the moment. It is a question of who is going to feed Japan.

Our land reforms in Japan have improved the agricultural production to such an extent that Japan is now where she was ten years ago. In other words it has taken care of the normal increase in population. If we hadn't increased the agricultural production there would have been the normal increase of population and Japan would have been in dire straits indeed. The problem with Japan then is really just beginning. I have said enough about the Russian Communist ambition here to indicate the nature of that problem. It is pretty much a question of who is going to feed it-if you want to analyze the factor that is going to have the greatest impact upon the power of Japan in relation with the power structure as we would like to see it. If we cannot arrange for Japan to be economically self-sufficient within our own orbit, then we really



do have a tough problem on our hands and the temptation of the Communist to exploit the situation and of many Japanese to deal with the continent and therefore to have to accept many of the Communist's political conditions is going to be very very great. In fact today Japanese business men are cautiously and carefully giving money to all parties including the Communist party so they are quite sure that they can have a good record in case the Communist party happens to take over. The danger is not immediate but it is not very far off.

In the Philippines we have a situation which is much more complicated. On the surface it looks very very good. Magsaysay's campaign against the Philippine Communists, the Hukbolahap's, seems to be going ahead with full steam and he has certainly captured quite a few of the leaders of the Philippine Communist party, but the long range view is not quite so pleasant. In the first place Magsaysay's success has depended a great deal upon his very intelligent approach to the problem. He has offered a plow for a gun. He has offered land to Hukbolahaps who would give up, etc., but he unfortunately has been unable to deliver the land with the speed which is going to be necessary to make his promises seem to be fulfilled. Up to date he has only been able to settle two or three hundred families. There are technical problems as to the speed with which you can cut down the forests and clear the land in Mindanao. There are political problems of Filipino senators who cheerfully get up and describe his relocation efforts as concentration camps. It is the normal hazard to expect in politicians but there it is. There are political graft and corruption in the show that are endangering his project quite a bit. Most people feel that the general long range view is not too good even on that level.

On the broader level the long range view is probably not so bright either, because there is not yet any sign that the people who really run the Philippines are willing to make the necessary changes there that will prevent the Communists from capturing the peasantry. I am referring to the sort of changes in the land ownership, etc., that we ourselves have put through in Japan. They have brought over our experts, they have asked our advice, in Japan we did remove the peasants from the Communists, but so far they have shown no real indication of doing anything serious about it. The Communists you see are working on a very long range pattern.

We have to accept the fight on their terms. They actually got hold of China fifteen years before they expected it. We know now the instructions had gone to villages in north China to settle in for a long range conflict. But they were there ready when the situation broke.

This raises for us the general question of how to fight it. I think that we, all of us, agree that the military measures that we have taken are essential and the more the better, that the economic measures we have taken might or might not be useful and that is what we have to examine.

Let me try to generalize about many of these countries, Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya, etc. The way you fight Communism depends upon

how you analyze it. What kind of movement is it? Many people analyze it in different ways. I have run into a good many people, for example, General Chen Cheng on Formosa who says, "the problem for you Americans is very simple, you just don't like Communism and you think of it on an ideological basis, but down here in Southeast Asia the problem is not that, it is purely a question of food, and rice is the answer to Communism." I have heard Indians say the same thing. Give people rice and you will have no Communism. That to my mind is rubbish, complete rubbish.

Communism has a great deal to do with how much food people have, but Communist leaders of the Communist movement do not come from the poor. I have taken a good deal of trouble to analyze where they do come from. In America sixty percent of the Communists are lawyers. In the Philippines I sat down with two Hukbolahaps, two Philippine Communists, (captured of course) and we went through the Filipino Politburo together, man by man, woman by woman, and I asked who they were? They were the sons of the rich, sons of the big landowners, industrialists, the big politicians, etc. Their education? Sometimes one degree, sometimes two degrees, many of them were lawyers and the lowest among them had been through high school as far as education is concerned. In India, who are the Indian leading Communists? They eat well, have been well educated & have been through one or two colleges. Some of the big landowners of the south, friends of the people I was talking with, went through school together. - There was nothing poor about them. Who are the Chinese Communists? Chou Enlai the foreign minister, comes from a very rich and very sophisticated family. Mao Tse-tung himself comes from a middle peasant family. He is literate, he was a librarian at the Peiping University. The movement was started by two Peiping College professors in 1919, so don't underestimate college professors. The Communists use peasants and they use workers, but they are not peasants and they are not workers. We go about this process of handling Communism in the Far East as if it were a movement of the poor, the discontented and what have you. The poverty has been there for centuries. The discontent has been there for centuries without Communism. The question is a matter of leadership and a matter of doctrine. A doctrine that is powerful and that appeals to people in certain conditions.

The Hukbolahap with whom I talked for three hours, was a lawyer who was discontented about the state of his country. The impact of America with its reforming zeal and of Christianity has been to arouse the social-consciousness of Far Eastern people but we have not always been able to provide them with the answers to the problems that have come up. This sort of man went into a library one day, picked up a volume of Marx and couldn't put it down again. Why? Because Marx and Lenin gave to him what he thought was a scientific answer to the problems as he saw them, the problems of Philippine poverty, of injustice and all the rest. This provided a scientific answer which was compelling and convincing, to him at least. So we have a problem on that level, a problem of destroying that doctrine, of reducing it to just another little dogma, and we can do it. It is a difficult job but it can be done. We can destroy it in its own terms because this doctrine is not what it used to be. It is now an instrument of state power, the state power of the Soviet Union and

currently of Peiping. They change it when state power requires the change. They change it whenever they want to. It is not what it was in 1917 before they got into power. We can do this job and we've got to do it, but you cannot do it by being ignorant of it.

Many of our troubles can be explained by their ignorance. Today the foreign service offices are asked to read "Stalin's Short History of the Communist Party," one of the basic books, which should have been studied years ago. Lenin should have been studied also. We should be extremely well informed on this level for it is no use going around the Far East today trying to make any contact with the people who are making policies or with the academic world which produces the people who are going to make policies unless you know your way around Marx and Lenin and Stalin. You just can't do it. You wouldn't know what they were talking about, you wouldn't even recognize the key words, key sentences, the key ideas and you would be completely helpless against a sophomore from a half-baked university in Manila unless you do know your way around the problem. Not all of us have to hold our own with these people, but for those of us who do it's a very good idea to know your way around Communist doctrine. We have this problem at home as well as abroad but it is one that has to be faced up to. It doesn't cost very much but it has to be met.

Then there is the problem of leadership. I am emphasizing this a little because it is not usually emphasized. I am in favor, if you wish, of point four programs and of economic assistance but only on the condition that they make sense within the general framework of what we are doing.

The Communists have no objection whatsoever of United States dollars building harbors in Bangkok, new communications, railroads, of improving the economic life of the Filipino peasant or building beautiful concrete roads, (when they probably would rather have more dirt roads) on condition that they, the Communists, can influence the minds of the people around there. They have no objections whatsoever because it gives them a target, a beautiful target, that says, "these Americans are doing this because they have to get rid of all the junk that they produce at home, it is a new form of imperialism". So long as they can control the minds of the people and take these things over, why should they object. There is no objection at all. So your point four program could actually make the job of the Communists just that much easier. It could smooth the way and prepare it for him. It will be much easier, unless, it is tied up with a sensible political approach and a little more effort on the level of trying to influence the leadership of this part of the world.

It cannot be done quickly. It took the Communists thirty years in China, thirty years to change the whole intellectual atmosphere of China to a degree where they could get their ideas over in short snappy slogans and get action when they wanted it in 1948 and 49. Thirty years of moving into the publishing houses, capturing the writers, the fiction writers, the pamphleteers, by moving into the universities, getting hold of the students, influencing the students and through the students the professors, etc., by moving into the whole intellectual world of China in thirty years they changed the whole intellectual climate of that country. They are trying to do the same thing in Japan now and

in the Philippines. It will take us just as long if not longer to change it back, to get across an idea of the things that we stand for.

Now if you happen to belong to the school of thought which says that we don't need any allies anywhere, I am wasting my breath. If you prefer that all battles in the world should be fought by no one but Americans, then I am also wasting my breath. But if you think that it is a good idea to have some friends, that we may possibly need some friends to maintain a balance of power out in the Far East, then we have a problem on our hands. We have all the weapons for solving that problem, and those weapons in the final analysis are moral weapons. Now I know there are people who disagree with this violently. They say that the only thing that persuades people is hardware and the more you throw at them the better. We've made a lot of hardware lately and we have made large Atomic bombs but what about the guy that cheerfully takes the secret away and gives it to somebody else? Perhaps not enough attention has been paid to him.

There are going to be traitors in every country but there are an awful lot of scientists who are not yet persuaded as to the need for security in these matters, and if you are pouring arms and ammunitions, building bases everywhere, what about the attitude of the local population? How many more troops will you need to protect your bases if the attitude is not friendly? This isn't a last analysis. Even Napoleon said, "the moral factors determined victory." I don't know whether Napoleon said the moral factors were final when he was winning or when he was losing, I have forgotten. But he certainly said in one stage of his career that the moral factors are the final decisive factors. I probably realize that when you are at one end of a sixteen inch gun, the moral factors aren't very important. When you are at the other end it is quite important. If the guy at the business end of it says, "I am an honorable man and will only fire when my conscious dictates it and in accord with the highest principles," the guy at the other end doesn't necessarily believe him. In other words the whole reputation of the country, the way it has generally behaved, the things it has said and stood for, but particularly what it has done in relation to these things--these are the things that ultimately determine whether people fight with you or against you.

From that point of view I think we have all the weapons. We couldn't have more, we don't need any more, because the big thing that has happened and has not yet been thoroughly noticed in the Far East today, is that we know much more about the Communist movement than we have ever known before. Secondly, the nature of the Communist movement has changed and has changed very considerably. It is now recognized for what it is, as a power, an aggressive, imperialistic, power structure, and our job to that extent is made just that much easier.

At the same time after the Yalta business we have recovered an enormous amount of moral standing. All of you may not agree with this. I was told by most people in the Far East that the one big thing that has really raised us right back to where the American record has always been has been the stand on the prisoner of war issue in Korea--the refusal to allow men to be shipped

back to captivity and death if they choose not to go. This is something we learned after the last war, but we are being watched with very shrewd eyes all through Asia on this issue. Will we stand or will we not? They will tell you this on Formosa. I talked with Chiang Kai-shek for sometime, and his attitude is this, he said, "well Mr. Taylor, you've not been unfriendly to China, I will be very frank. When the Russians choose another leader in another country, they support him and they support him to the end, and when you choose one you let him down. Perhaps you can learn a few lessons from the Russians." The last part he said in Chinese and the interpreter didn't translate it, he just blushed but I happened to get through his accent and understand what he said. This is not limited to Chiang Kai-shek, it is all over Asia. India particularly and in all other parts of Asia we are thought of as people who let somebody down. Now, there is another side to the story, I'm not discussing that. What I am doing is reporting impressions. The fact that we have stood firm over this prisoner of war issue, and I hope to God continue to stand firm, has done more to recover our moral prestige in Asia than any other single thing, and it took quite a bit after Yalta and some of the other mistakes.

If this analysis of the Communist movement is true, and I cannot accept any other, then our task is on that level. If you turn to me and say it is just a matter of food, I will say to you, you might as well fold up your tent now and disappear. Have we got enough resources to put a rice bowl in the hand of every potential Communist in the world? Of course not, on the contrary the situation is getting worse than that. Our economists tell us that our own standard of living and the Canadian standard of living ~~are~~ going up at the rate of two percent a year. The standard of living of the Asiatic countries, assuming all the help that we can give, all the point four, ECA, MSA, everything that we can give is going down two percent a year, and the contrast between our standard of living and theirs is going to get worse and worse from their point of view. So if your analysis of Communism is just a matter of food then we are licked, we're through. Obviously it is not, and if it is what I say it is then you will have to fight it on that level.

For example, if you have a point four program, if you are improving the agricultural situation in a certain area you must do it with native leaders if possible, not Americans, but native leaders who see the thing in its democratic implications. Now this sounds very vague. Let me make it concrete. In the Philippines a Hukbolahap comes up to a peasant and says, "this is a very fine tractor you have here." The peasant says, "yes, this is an American tractor, it comes through the local ECA", and the Communist says, "yes, you know why you got it don't you?" He says that they over-produced these tractors and they have to get rid of them in order to maintain their capitalistic economy and they rammed them down the throat of your government which has to pay for them out of the pesos they take from you." Your average American cannot answer that at all, he just gets mad and thinks the fellow is a pretty low form of life and has no convincing answer. If the Filipino, not the peasant but the educated Filipino in the same village, has a correct view of democracy and the way it operates and of capitalist democracy, if he has an alternative explanation for all of this, which is a little closer to the truth, then there is a chance that some benefits out of this tractor and the things that go with it might come to the democratic cause.

So long as the explanation does not go with it, and I do not mean posters, or selling America like holidays in the sun, we are losing the impact of our generosity. If you have your point four program with a training program that has brought your native administrators etc., into the general swim of things as we see it, then your tractor is worth ten tractors. If you don't you are merely making the job so much easier for the Hukbolahaps.

So the power situation as I see it in the Far East today is one that rests pretty much on the struggle for what people think. We've got plenty of hardware out there, we can send a lot more. We've still got economic resources which we can use if necessary. The issue is going to be settled on the question of what people think. This is not a matter of sloganized democracy, of just picking up nice things out of the Bill of Rights and just throwing them at the Russians--that doesn't hurt anybody. It is not a matter of selling America. What is the use of the Voice of America telling all the people there that you are well fed, well dressed, have good transportation, and are well taken care of? So what? It just makes them mad. What is the use of broadcasting about the riches and resources and the superior technology of the United States, the high standards of living, the beautiful elms that shade our lovely streets and then tell people they can't come. It makes them jealous, angry and annoyed. That is the advertising man's approach to the problem. Its a waste of money. Worse than a waste of money, it means that we might have to shoot more people in the end.

The problem is a very different one. We have all the moral values to handle it. We have the record, we haven't been to Sunday school I know, but by and large, compared to most people, we do have a decent record. The most bitter Chinese on Formosa said "we do know you don't want other people's territory, we do know that you don't want to run us, and that you have the most homesick army in the world." They all want to go home. They don't like to stay around in other peoples countries. We are doing things to some extent on this level but not the way its got to be done.

I am hoping therefore, that the whole energies of this country will be put into the effort of attacking Communism where it really matters. On leadership, by building up the counter leadership of a democratic sort in these countries and on doctrine, by studying, constantly hammering away at it in colleges, and schools, here and abroad, writing about it, books, pamphlets, novels, biographies, etc., in such a way as to make a difference.

There is one last point to illustrate. My Hukbolahap friend said that he had turned against the Philippine Communists. I am very interested in this. I know how long it takes and how difficult it is for people to turn away from Communism. So I said, "are there any books that helped?" He said, "yes, I read some books from the USIS library in Manila." I said, "what did you read?" He said, "I read, Kravchinsk<sup>enkov</sup>'s, I Chose Freedom", but it is fairytales. I thought that was a pretty bad beginning, so I said, "what about that book, 'The God That Failed', you remember the book about six ex-communists writing their experiences?" He said it was a wonderful book. I asked him what was wonderful about it. He said, "the Silone story." I asked him what was

wonderful about the Silone story, which I remembered very well of course. "Well it verbalized for me the doubts I already had in my own mind and had been afraid to admit to myself". Here was a Catholic country, Italy, and an Italian intellectual. It was the same sort of problems as in the Philippines, also a Catholic country. So then I pulled out of my bag of books a book which I thought would really be new to him, a book by Stern, a German American writing to a French Marxist, called "American Capitalism a Classless Society," and he met the Marxist argument all the way through. I thought it would be particularly valuable. I said, "Look at it, it is a very good book indeed." He had already read it and thought it very good. There are advantages in being in jail, you at least get time for reading.

What was the record of the Japanese, not the Japanese American but the Japanese who has been educated in America and has gone back to Japan?

The record of the Japanese American of course, is a very damn good one, especially in the Italian campaign, etc. The record of the Japanese who was educated here and went back to Japan is not so good. The reasons are several. In the first place they were thoroughly indoctrinated before coming over and Matsuoka, for example who went to the University of Oregon, is a typical example and he just hated our guts, but he came that way, he expected to go back that way. If he hadn't gone back that way he would have lost his job. I talked with Japanese in Japan before the war and I asked them about the returned student from England or America? The fellow I was talking with said, "well look at me", he was one of them and he was not in a very important position. Back home they had very little influence and it had become, so especially since 1932 when the army took over up until the war. The man who had been trained in America, or the United Kingdom, or western Europe had a very rough time, and if he had become an apologist in any sense for these countries, he would have cut off his career. It was just as simple as that. So they didn't have too much influence. After the war the thing came out, it wasn't wasted you see. These are the fellows who once given the opportunity to turn against the military, turned against them with some fierceness.

On the first part of your question, what is being done now to make contact with potential Asiatic leaders, etc.?

What we are doing now is following what you might call a bilateral approach. The Department of State and Agriculture, but mainly State, invites people from various countries and brings them here, purely bilateral. That is very good and should be done. But I don't think we always bring the right people. For example, the problem in China before the war was with the military not with the professors. We should have brought over hundreds and hundreds of Chinese military and not sent them either to West point or Annapolis for most of their time. They should have been sent to places where they could see our whole society in operation. Those were the boys who fouled the thing up after the war and they had no way of getting on with the Chinese intellectuals and the Communists came over and neutralized the intellectuals, you see. They may bring over the wrong people but the idea is all right. It is much more important to mix up the peoples of Asia. They are isolated, we know much more about Asia than any Asiatic. At the University of Calcutta, I said, "how many Indian professors can read Chinese?" They said possibly three. Three hundred and fifty million people and possibly only three Indian professors. Now there are more Indians who speak Chinese, but <sup>not</sup> in the academic profession. For every Indian who has been to China there are hundreds of thousands of Americans, for every book they have on China we have libraries, for every course they have in their universities, we have curriculum.

The Filipino is completely ignorant of any other part of Asia. They have no professors of Chinese history, politics, or Japanese, etc., in their universities. We have more in my institute here than they have in the Philippines. Japan is the best informed. Of course, the Japanese have been around a bit, but they haven't been around in the last ten years so they are getting out of date. So we have to mix these people up, because in isolation they are duck soup for the Communists. They can get them to believe anything. They have ideas about America that are preposterous it makes you weep.

So this aspect of the program should be stepped up, not just for giving these people a good time in the United States but getting all these people together to do meaningful jobs together. We assume this with Europe. There are all sorts of levels upon which we have contact with Europeans labor unions, professional societies, academic societies, science, etc.

I lectured at the war college in Formosa several times and after one of my lectures the general said, "what would you think of our using a Chinese division in Korea and rotating it so that the whole army will get experience?" I said, "I think it would be a wonderful idea if you want to make sure that the truce talks will come to an immediate end," which was his idea of course. I couldn't blame him from his point of view. I personally never thought they would come to anything anyway so I couldn't pick much a quarrel with him. They apparently had complete confidence that if their men were used in Korea they would acquit themselves honorably and well. I went down with Admiral Radford's group to see the big shoot in Formosa when he was there, and I know he was impressed, and to a layman like myself, it was quite impressive too. The officers didn't sip tea while the men were clambering up the hills. They went up with them, and General Chase has accomplished apparently quite a lot there. Chaing Kai-shek said, "if I can get upon any part of the main land and hold it for six months then we are on our way. If I ever get thrown off it is no use going back again for a very long time. It is my problem to select a place where I am sure I can get the cooperation of the people."

